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NOTES
Arbitration: Kentucky Courts
Should Not Liberally Vacate Awards -
Carrs Fork v. Kodak Mining
BY WILLIAM G. FOWLER 11*
INTRODUCTION
A rbitration is a form of dispute resolution that was first
implemented by the Greek city-states as early as the sixth
century B.C.' Arbitration is:
a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an
impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for a decision
based upon the evidence and arguments to be presented before the
arbitrator. The parties agree in advance that the arbitrator's determina-
tion, the award, will be accepted as final and binding upon them.2
*J.D. expected 1998, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1994, Georgetown
College.
See James E. Becdey, Equity and Arbitration, 949 PLI/CoRP. 31, 37
(1996) ("Although the history of arbitration can be traced through archaeological
finds dating as far back as 2800 B.C., it is the Greeks who created a procedure
that closely resembles current arbitration procedures." (citation omitted)).
2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at 1 (G. Wilner ed.,
1984); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990) ("A process of
dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision
after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard."); Thomas
. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 429-30
(1988) ("Arbitration is often described as everything that civil litigation is not.
Observers frequently depict arbitration as a speedy and economical process
characterized by informal hearings before one or more judges selected on the
basis of knowledge and expertise in the commercial context of the dispute."
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Because arbitration is economical, efficient, and informal, it has become a
favored alternative to litigation Before 1984, Kentucky law stated that
contractual agreements between parties to arbitrate future disputes were
invalid and unenforceable.4 The 1984 enactment of a version of the Uniform
Arbitration Acte and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp.6 constituted a reversal of the
common law rule and "were intended to more effectively accommodate and
encourage arbitration as a substitute for litigation."7
Recognizing that arbitration is a viable alternative to litigation, most
courts have afforded arbitration awards great deference.8 Consequently,
judicial review of arbitration awards has been limited.' The standard of
review of arbitration awards in Kentucky, however, is less deferential than
modem trends. In Part I, this Note examines the acceptance of arbitration in
Kentucky, including the enactment of a version of the Uniform Arbitration
Act and the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Kodak Mining Co. v.
Carrs Fork Corp.'° Analyzing the standard of review applied in Kentucky
in deciding whether to vacate an arbitration award, Part II of this Note
focuses on the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Cams Fork Corp. v.
Kodak Mining Co.' Part Il contrasts the standard for vacating awards in
(footnotes omitted)); Sylvan Gotshal, The Art ofArbitration, 48 A.B.A.J. 553,
553 (1962) ("Arbitration is a simple, uncomplicatedsystem, createdthrough need
by trial and error, whereby mankind has settled and does settle disputes of every
kind or nature through the acceptanceof thejudgment of one or more reasonable
and competent honorable men as the final settlement of the dispute.").
' See Cheryl Aptowitzer, Note, Arbitration-Judicial Review ofArbitration
Awards-Courts May Review and Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an
Arbitrator Commits Gross, Unmistakable, or Not Reasonably Debatable Errors
of Law or Where the Arbitrator Manifestly Disregards the Law and the Result
Is Unjust - Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 NJ. 479, 610
A.2d 364 (1992), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 998, 998-1000 (1993). See infra notes
145-47 and accompanying text.
4 See Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944).
5 The current Kentucky version of the Uniform Arbitration Act is codified
at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter KRS] §§ 417.045-.240 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1992 & Supp. 1996).
6 Kodak Mining Co. v. Cars Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
7 Thomas I Stipanowich, Arbitration, 74 KY. L.J. 319, 319 (1985-86).
8 See Aptowitzer, supra note 3, at 1001.
9 See id.
'0 See infra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
" Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co., 809 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1991). See
infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text. The lawsuit between Kodak Mining
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Kentucky with the standard in Georgia12 by examining the Georgia Arbitra-
tion Code and the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Greene v.
Hundley.'3 Part IV explores judicial interpretations of the Federal Arbitration
Act and the standards for vacating awards exercised by various courts when
applying the Federal Act 4 Finally, this Note concludes by demonstrating
that the standard for vacating arbitration awards applied by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Carrs Fork is contrary to policy considerations favoring
arbitration and arbitration awards." Consequently, Kentucky should adopt
the standard applied by the Georgia Supreme Court in Hundley and the
majority of courts under the Federal Arbitration Act.
I. THE ACCEPTANCE OF ARBITRATION IN KENTUCKY
In Kodak Mining Co. v. CarrS Fork Corp.,16 the Kentucky Supreme
Court determined "whether an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under
a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce is valid and
specifically enforceable by stay of ajudicial proceeding brought in Kentucky
where the proceeding involves issues referable to arbitration."' 7 The court
held that such agreements are irrevocable and specifically enforceable, thus
signifying a reversal of the Commonwealth's common law.'
A. The Kentucky Supreme Court's Decision in Kodak Mining
Kodak Mining involved an action brought by Cars Fork Corporation, a
lessor under two coal mining leases. 9 'Both of the leases contained a broad
arbitration clause."2 The clause in the first lease, dated March 31, 1956,
and Cars Fork involved two separate stages. The Supreme Court's decision in
1984 will be referred to in the text as Kodak Mining. The case was before the
Supreme Court again in 1991; its 1991 decision, which is the primary focus of
this Note, will be referred to in the text as Carrs Fork.
2 Georgia's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act is similar to the version
enacted in Kentucky. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
'3 Greenev. Hundley, 468 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1996). See infra notes 69-95 and
accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 96-140 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
16 Kodak Mining Co. v. Carts Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
17 Id. at 919.
IS See id.
'9 See id. at 918.
20 id.
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provided: "If at any time, at termination of this lease or otherwise, there shall
be a controversy concerning any item or term of this lease, the said Lessee
and Lessor agree to arbitrate as follows . .21 The clause in the second
lease, dated April 1, 1956, provided:
In the event of any difference or dispute arising between the parties hereto,
growing out of the terms of this lease, or the construction thereof, or the
operations of the lessee -or rights or obligations of the lessor or lessee
hereunder, such questions hall be determined by arbitration in the manner
provided for in this article and the fact that arbitration is especially provided
for under certain clauses hereof shall not be deemed to exclude arbitration
under other clauses where not so specifically provided.22
When Carrs Fork brought an action against Kodak, alleging violations of
Kodak's obligations under the leases, Kodak raised Carrs Fork's failure to
arbitrate the dispute as a defense. The trial judge rejected Kodak's arbitration
defense and ordered the litigation to continue. Kodak sought interlocutory
relief from the court of appeals, which denied Kodak's motion. Kodak then
sought further interlocutory relief from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.23
In determining that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were
specifically enforceable, the court referred to its 1977 decision in Fite &
Warmath Construction Co. v. MYS Corp.24 In Fite, the court held that the
U.S. Arbitration Act of 1925 applies "to actions brought in the courts of this
state where the purpose of the action is to enforce voluntary arbitration
agreements in contracts evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce." '25
In Kodak Mining, the court clarified its holding in Fite and held that
Kentucky has no public policy preventing enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate future disputes irrespective of whether the Federal Arbitration Act
or comparable legislation applies.26
B. The Codification of the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act
Following Kodak Mining's reversal of the common law treatment of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, the Kentucky legislature enacted a
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977).
25 Id. at 734.
26 See Kodak Mining, 669 S.W.2d at 921.
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modem, broad arbitration statute that made agreements to arbitrate future
disputes "valid, enforceable and irrevocable., 27 Although arbitration was
first recognized by Kentucky legislation approximately two hundred years
ago, the 1984 Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act represented the first
time agreements to arbitrate future disputes were enforceable.2"
The Uniform Arbitration Act was adopted by the National Conference
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955 and amended in
1956, and approved by the American Bar Association in 1955 and
1956.29 Although Kentucky's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act is
somewhat limited,3" it represents a notable improvement in arbitration
law in Kentucky." Furthermore, the Kentucky legislature expressly
recognized the goal of making uniform the law of arbitration in states that
adopt the Uniform Act.32 The effect of the Act should be a decrease in
conflict-of-law issues in Kentucky and other jurisdictions.33
I1. VACATION OF ARBITRATION AWARDs:
THE KENTUCKY STANDARDS
Before the enactment of the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act,
Kentucky courts could vacate arbitration awards based on "equitable
principles."'34 The Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act, however, includes
a specific provision that establishes when a court shall vacate an
arbitration award. 5 The primary focus of the remainder of this Note is
to demonstrate that the statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards
27 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 328 (citing 1984 Ky. Acts. 278).
28 See id. at 328. For a complete discussion of prior Kentucky statutes
governing arbitration and arbitration awards, see Alvin L. Goldman, A Proposed
Arbitration Act for Kentucky, 22 ARB. J. 193, 208-09 (1967).29 See AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 2.
3' For a comprehensive analysis of the limitations of the Kentucky Uniform
Arbitration Act, see Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 332-33. See also KRS §
417.050 (stating that this Arbitration Act does not apply to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or to insurance contracts).
"' See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 333.
32 See id.
33 See id.
31 See Law of July 1, 1953, KRS § 417.018 (translating Civil Code §
451(8)) (repealedin 1984 by the Uniform ArbitrationAct, KRS §§ 417.045-.240)
[hereinafter KRS § 417.018 (repealed)].
" See KRS § 417.160. This author has found no Kentucky case in which
this statutory provision has been applied.
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should be exclusive. Kentucky courts' ability to vacate arbitration awards
through their equitable powers should not survive the enactment of the
Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act.
A. Current Statutory Requirements for Vacating an Arbitration
Award in Kentucky
Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") § 417.160 governs when a
Kentucky court shall vacate an arbitration award.36 Essentially, the
36 KRS § 417.160 provides:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award
where:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means;
(b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as
a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party;
(c) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of KRS 417.090, as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party; or
(e) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not
adversely determined in proceedings under KRS 417.060 and the
party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising
the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not
or would not be granted by a court is not ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award.
(2) An application under this section shall be made within ninety
(90) days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant; except
that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall
be made within ninety (90) days after such grounds are known or
should have been known.
(3) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in paragraph
(a) of subsection (1) of this section, the court may order a rehearing
before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement, or in the
absence thereof, by the court in accordance with KRS 417.070; or, if
the award is vacated on grounds set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d) of
subsection (1) of this section, the court may order a rehearing before the
arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in
accordance with KRS 417.070. The time within which the agreement
requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and
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Kentucky Act requires a court to affirm an arbitration award unless there
was corruption, fraud, or partiality, or the arbitrator exceeded his or her
powers. Although the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act was not
controlling, 7 the Supreme Court of Kentucky referenced this provision
of the Kentucky Act in Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co.,38 when
the case was before it a second time in 1991."
B. The Kentucky Supreme Court's Vacation of the Arbitration Award
in Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co.
When Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp.4" was before the
Kentucky Supreme Court initially in 1984, Kodak argued for specific
enforcement of its agreement with Carrs Fork to arbitrate future
disputes.4 ' The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the agreement
between Kodak and Carrs Fork was valid and enforceable.42 On remand,
a majority of the three-member arbitration panel ruled in favor of Carrs
Fork, citing Kodak's failure to diligently mine the coal leases.4 The
circuit court accepted the decision of the arbitrators but the court of
appeals reversed.44 Carts Fork then appealed to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, which affirmed the decision of the appellate court to vacate the
award.4
5
The Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act was not applicable in Carrs
Fork because Carrs Fork and Kodak entered into their arbitration
agreement in 1956.46 The Kentucky Uniform Act expressly states that
it is applicable only to arbitration agreements entered into after its
commences on the date of the order.
(4) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify
or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
Id. (emphasis added).
s7 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
38 Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co., 809 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1991).
39 See id. at 702.
40 Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984).
41 See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
42 See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
43 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 701.
" See id.
45 See id.
46 See Kodak Mining, 669 S.W.2d at 918.
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effective date, July 13, 1984.47 Common law and previous arbitration
statutes, therefore, were controlling in Carrs Fork.
The applicable arbitration statute, enacted in 1942, contained a
provision that governed judicial review of arbitration awards: "No award
shall be set aside for the want of form. But courts shall have power over
awards on equitable principles as heretofore." ' Although the appropriate
scope of judicial review had been the subject of much debate, it was the
common law rule that an arbitrator's decision would not be vacated for
mere mistakes of law or fact; an arbitrator's judgment would be set aside
only if there was "clear and convincing evidence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption in the arbitration proceedings." ' 9 Prior to Carrs Fork, the
1942 Kentucky statute was interpreted consistently with these common
law principles."
In Carrs Fork, the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that "[i]t
is well settled that the general rule is that an arbitration award will not be
set aside for any error, whether in law or fact."'" In fact, the majority
opinion, written by Justice Wintersheimer, emphasized the judicial
deference afforded arbitration determinations.52 The court recognized
that the Kentucky rule regarding judicial review of arbitration awards is
found in Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co.,53 where the Supreme Court of
Kentucky stated:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary
course would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor in
place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of litigation. 4
47 See KRS § 417.230.
48 See id. § 417.018 (repealed).
41 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 331-32. These common law grounds for
vacation parallel the statutory grounds provided by the Kentucky Arbitration Act.
o See Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co., 618 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. 1981) (explaining
that the scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is strictly limited and
that an award may be set aside only if there has been a "gross mistake of law or
fact constituting evidence of misconduct amounting to fraud or undue partiality"
(citation omitted)).
51 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 701 (emphasis added).
52 See id.
13 Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co., 618 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1981).
14 Id. at 433 (quoting Burchell v. March, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855)).
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The court in Taylor also stated that an arbitration award may be vacated
only if there has been a gross mistake of law or fact constituting evidence
of misconduct amounting to fraud or undue partiality.a Because neither
party in Taylor suggested fraud or undue partiality by the arbitrators, the
award was not reviewable by the judiciary. 6
In addition to acknowledging common law principles regarding the
finality of an arbitration award, the court in Carrs Fork explained that
under the Uniform Arbitration Act the grounds for vacating an arbitration
award included "fraud, corruption, undue partiality, misconduct,
exceeding the powers of the arbitrator, refusal to hear material evidence,
prejudicial misconduct at the hearing, lack of a valid arbitration agree-
ment, the issue not having been determined adversely in court."57 The
court's presentation of the Kentucky rules regarding the finality of
arbitration awards was correct; the injustice of the court's decision is its
application of Kentucky law to the arbitration award and its unjustified
encroachment upon the independence of the arbitration process through
expansion of the legal principles enumerated in Taylor.
Even though the court emphasized it could not set aside an arbitration
award due to a mistake of law or fact, it nevertheless vacated the award
due to an alleged mistake of law. The court stated that the arbitration
award must be vacated because the arbitrators "ignored the legal maxim
that the law abhors a forfeiture of a coal lease."' However, even though
the arbitrators' decision did not reflect the legal abomination of the
forfeiture of a coal lease, the decision, at worst, was based on a mistake
of law. In such a case, the law of Kentucky dictated that the judiciary
leave the award undisturbed.59 The court attempted to justify its decision
by emphasizing its equitable powers over arbitration awards, stating that
the legal principles enunciated in Taylor should be broadened because
"[t]here are some situations which do require equitable treatment, and we
believe this is such a case."60 The court also quoted Second Society of
Universalists v. Royal Insurance Co.6 for the proposition that "'an
15 Id.; see also Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 253 S.W.2d 629 (Ky.
1952); First Baptist Church (Colored) v. Hall, 246 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1952).
56 See Taylor, 618 S.W.2d at 433.
57 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 702. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
58 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 701.
" See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
60 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 702.
6 Second Soc'y of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 109 N.E. 384 (Mass.
1915).
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award might be so grossly and palpably below the actual loss as to afford
intrinsic evidence of fraud, bias or prejudice."' 62 However, there was
no basis for the court to hold that the arbitrators' failure to recognize that
the law disfavors the forfeiture of a coal lease was a palpable mistake. In
addition, it was unwise to broaden the standard of judicial review of
arbitration awards to allow the court to intervene in the name of
equity.63 This decision contradicts the modem trend.'
62 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 702 (quoting Royal Ins., 109 N.E. at 387)
(emphasis added).
63 See id. at 704 (Leibson, J., dissenting). Justice Leibson stated:
The standard for vacating the arbitration award (as both parties
agreed) is 'gross mistake of law or fact proving undue partiality.' At
oral argument Kodak Mining conceded there was no single error of law
or fact qualifying under this standard and that he was relying instead on
the cumulative effect of a number of alleged errors.
... Kodak Mining insisted on its right to arbitrate and got it; it
should now be prepared to accept the results absent proof of some
illegality amounting to a fraud....
... We should keep a clear line of demarcation between the
standard for reviewing the decision of a lower court and an agreed
arbitration. By failing to abide by the difference, the Majority Opinion
strikes at the heart of the process of arbitration.
Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
' See Verdex Steel & Constr. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 509 P.2d 240
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Metro Dist. Comm'n v. American Fed'n of State, County
& Mun. Employees, Council 4, Local 184, 654 A.2d 384, 386 (Conn. App. Ct.
1995) ("Judicial review of arbitration awards is, therefore, limited in scope by
[General Statutes of Connecticut §] 52-418 and our courts 'will not disturb an
arbitration award unless it clearly falls within the proscriptions of [that
statute]."') (quoting City of Hartfordv. Hartford Bd. ofMediation& Arbitration,
557 A.2d 1236 (Conn. 1989)); Affiliated Marketing, Inc. v. Dyco Chem. &
Coatings, Inc., 340 So.2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Mathewson v. Aloha
Airlines, Inc., 919 P.2d 969, 981 (Haw. 1996) ("Courts are authorized to vacate
an arbitration award based only on the four grounds specified in [the Hawaii
Revised Statutes §1 658-9."); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co.,
665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983); Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441
N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Indiana Dep't of Admin., Per. Div. v. Sightes,
416 N.E.2d 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Charles Ragusa & Son, Inc. v. St. John
the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd., 629 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
("Louisiana courts have consistently held that although an appeal may be taken
from a judgment entered upon an arbitration award, the grounds are limited to
those enumerated in [Louisiana Revised Statutes §] 9:4210."); Massachusetts
Highway Dep't v. American Fed'il of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council
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The court attempted to cloak the impact of its decision in Carrs Fork
by stating that the decision "should not be taken as a signal that
arbitration awards will be casually overturned."65 The court further
stated that it reversed the particular award in Carrs Fork "because of the
failure of the award to provide equity so as to produce palpable error."66
Based on the facts of Carrs Fork, this reasoning makes it difficult to
imagine that the court has not dramatically altered arbitration law in
Kentucky.67 Moreover, it seems to confirm Justice Leibson's claim in
93, 648 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Mass. 1995) ("Vacationof arbitration awards is limited
to the grounds set forth in [Massachusetts General Laws] c. 150C, § 11.");
AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Reg'l Corrections Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295
(Minn. 1984); Savage Educ. Ass'n v. Trustees of Richland County Elem. Dist.
#7, 692 P.2d 1237 (Mont. 1984); New Shy Clown Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin, 737
P.2d 524 (Nev. 1987); Kearny PBA No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 405 A.2d 393
(N.J. 1979); Cortale v. Schweitzer, 511 N.Y.S.2d 128, 128 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) ("[E]rrors of law or fact committed by the arbitrator do not constitute
grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards[.]"); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M.
LaFave Co., 321 S.E.2d 872 (N.C. 1984); Shorts v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l
Transit Auth., No. CV-238628, 1994 WL 326019, 2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 7,
1994) ("[T]he jurisdiction of the... court is limited to confirmation, vacation,
modification or enforcement of the award and only on the terms provided by
statute."); Aamot v. Eneboe, 352 N.W.2d 647, 649 (S.D. 1984); Utility Trailer
Sales of Salt Lake v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987); Phillips Bldg. Co.
v. An, 915 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) ("An arbitration award can
be vacated only upon one of the grounds specified in [Revised Code of
Washington §] 7.04.160."); DeBaker v. Shah, 522 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1994) ("The state's policy is to encourage arbitration as an alternative to
litigation; consequently arbitration awards are presumed valid and will only be
set aside upon showing that a statutory ground for vacatur exists."), rev'd on
other grounds 533 N.W.2d 464 (Wis. 1995). But see Texas West Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1060-61 (Wyo. 1986) (finding that the
statute mandating vacation of arbitration awards in specified circumstances does
not prohibit courts from vacating an award on other grounds, but merely requires
courts to vacate an award if any of the grounds specified exist).
65 Carrs Fork, 809 S.W.2d at 703.
66 Id.
67 The court's disapproval of the finality of arbitration regarding questions
of law is best exemplified by Justice Combs' concurring opinion:
KRS 417.018 purports to close the courthouse doors as to mistakes
of law and fact, to persons who have electedto be bound by arbitration.
This statute represents a usurpation of the judicial power by the
legislature in that it purports to give finality to the conclusions of law
of the arbitrators. Only the people have the power to change the
1996-97]
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his dissent that the "Majority Opinion strikes at the heart of the process
of arbitration."6 8 The expansion of judicial power over arbitration
awards in Carrs Fork is seemingly far-reaching and establishes a bad
precedent. Primarily, the decision leaves open the issue of whether the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award articulated in the Kentucky
Uniform Arbitration Act will be exclusive in cases where the Act is
applicable.
III. VACATION OF ARBITRATION AWARDS:
THE GEORGIA STANDARDS
The Kentucky Arbitration Act is based on the Uniform Arbitration
Act.69 Many other states have enacted similar legislation also based on
the Uniform Arbitration Act.7" One state that has enacted legislation that
constitution. Section 26 of our constitution provides that all things
contrary to the Bill of Rights and this constitution are null and void.
There is a need to expedite the termination of controversies.
Arbitration may be one such vehicle. But under our constitution neither
the parties nor the arbitrators can tie the hands of the court on questions
of law.
Id. at 703 (Combs, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 704 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
69 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
70 Arbitration legislation in other states based on the Uniform Arbitration
Act include: ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (1993 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (Michie 1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to
12-1518 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -204 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-201 to -223 (1987 & Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1974 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
4301 to 4319 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.22 (West 1990); IDAHO
CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. 710/5-1 to /5-23 (1993); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 344-2-1 to -22 (Michie 1986); IOWA CODE §§ 679A-1-19 (West
1987); KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, §§ 5927-5949 (West 1980); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201
to -234 (1995); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH.
COMp. LAWS §§ 600.5001-.5035 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30 (West
1988 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (West 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to' -324 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2 to .20
(1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.015-.205 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-
7-1 to -22 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20 (1996); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-
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is substantially similar to the Kentucky Arbitration Act is Georgia.7" In
818 (West 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 7301-7320 (West 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
21-25A-1 to -38 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301
to -320 (Supp. 1996); TEXAS REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 to 238-6 (West);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3la-1 to -20 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-
5695 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to -581.016 (Michie 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-10-1 to -
8 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-.18 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (Michie 1977).
Nebraska has also enacted a version of the Uniform Arbitration Act codified
at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 (1995). The Supreme Court of
Nebraska has held, however, that the Act violates Article I, Section 13 of the
Nebraska Constitution to the extent that the Act provides for arbitration of future
disputes. See State v. NebraskaAss'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb.
1991).
Arbitration legislation not based on the Uniform Arbitration Act includes:
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1284.2 (West 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1
to -18 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -15 (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:4201-4217 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15 to -37 (1972 &
Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-11 (1974 & Supp. 1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.300-
.365 (1995); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (1956 & Supp. 1995).
7m See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-1 to -13 (Supp. 1996). Although the Georgia
Arbitration Code is not based on the Uniform Arbitration Act, the grounds for
vacating an award enumerated in the Code parallel those in the Kentucky
Arbitration Act. Section 9-9-13 governs when a Georgia court may vacate an
arbitration award. It states:
(a) An application to vacate an award shall be made to the court
within three months after delivery of a copy of the award to the
applicant.
(b) The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who
either participated in the arbitration or was served with a demand for
arbitration if the court finds that the rights of the party were prejudiced
by:
(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
(3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such
imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made; or
(4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part, unless the
party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration
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Greene v. Hundley,72 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals to vacate an arbitration award.
In Greene, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the Georgia Arbitration
Code73 and determined that it provided the exclusive grounds for
vacating an arbitration award.74
Greene involved a contractual agreement between a homeowner,
Hundley, and a construction contractor, Greene, whereby Greene agreed
to build a residence for Hundley.75 The contract contained an arbitration
clause that stated:
with notice of this failure and without objection.
(c).The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who
neither participated in the arbitration nor was served with a demand for
arbitration or order to compel arbitration if the court finds that:
(1) The rights of the party were prejudiced by one of the
grounds specified in subsection (b) of this Code section;
(2) A valid agreement to arbitrate was not made;
(3) The agreement to arbitrate has not been complied with; or
(4) The arbitrated claim was barred by limitation of time, as
provided by this part.
(d) The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not
be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award.
(e) Upon vacating an award, the court may order a rehearing and
determination of all or any of the issues either before the same
arbitrators or before new arbitrators appointed as provided by this part.
In any provision of an agreement limiting the time for a hearing or
award, time shall be measured from the date of such order or rehearing,
whichever is appropriate, or a time may be specified by the court. The
court's ruling or order under this Code section shall constitute a final
judgment and shall be subject to appeal in accordance with the appeal
provisions of this part.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (Supp. 1996). Compare this statute with KRS §
417.160, at supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72 Greene v. Hundley, 468 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1996).
73 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-1 to -13 (Supp. 1996).
74 See Greene, 468 S.E.2d at 351. The court held that "[olur consideration
of the Georgia Arbitration Code and the general purpose of arbitration leads us
to conclude that an arbitration award may be vacated only if one or more of the
four statutory grounds set forth in section 9-9-13(b) is found to exist." Id.
71 See id.
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Any controversy relating to the construction of the residence or any other
matter arising out of the terms of this contract shall be settled by binding
arbitration. The cost incurred and the fees of the arbitrators shall be assessed
between the parties as determined by the arbitrators. A hearing shall be
conducted pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association
with regard to the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. Notice of
intention to arbitrate with the American Arbitration Association shall be sent
by certified mail to the respective parties.7 6
When disputes arose over the construction of the residence, they were
submitted for arbitration as required by the contract. Following an extensive
two-day hearing, the arbitrator ruled in favor of both parties, awarding
$17,000 to Hundey and $20,400 to Greene. The arbitration award, however,
set forth no findings of fact."
Hundley filed an application to vacate the arbitration award with the
superior court. The superior court denied the application and entered an order
confirming the award, explaining that Hundley failed to establish the
existence of any of the four grounds for vacating an award set forth in the
Georgia Arbitration Code. Hundley then appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals.7
8
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the superior court
and vacated the arbitration award. 79 The appellate court stated that although
arbitration awards are controlled exclusively by the Georgia Arbitration Code,
they are still subject to the judicial requirement that they be based upon
findings of fact supported by the evidence of record.8" The court acknowl-
edged that it could not weigh evidence that was considered by the arbitrator;
however, the court concluded that the rule applies only if there is evidence
to support the award in the first place.8' The court reasoned that "[a]rbitra-
tion is part of the judicial process, for the legislature made arbitration subject
to judicial review on the application of any party."'2 Greene appealed the
decision to vacate the arbitration award to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
In Greene, the Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged that the Georgia
Arbitration Code was controlling. The court stated that the enactment of the
Arbitration Code "repealed common law arbitration in its entirety, and it
76 id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 352.
80 See Hundley v. Greene, 461 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
81 See id.
82 Id. at 253.
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must, therefore, be strictly construed."83 The court further recognized the
statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award and stated that they were
the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award.84 The court based
this determination on relevant case law 5 and the fact the Georgia Arbitra-
tion Code specifically states that '"merely because the relief granted in the
arbitration award 'could not or would not be granted by a court of law or
equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm an award."'"6
In applying these principles of Georgia law, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals and reinstated the
arbitration award. The court found that since no evidence that any of the
statutory grounds for vacation existed, the court was "bound to confirm the
award.""7 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the lower court
erred in determining that the rule prohibiting a court from evaluating evidence
that the arbitrator considered is dependent upon the existence of some
evidence to support the award.8" The court explained:
The prohibition against considering the sufficiency of the evidence as
grounds for vacating an arbitration award is unconditional. Therefore, a
reviewing court is prohibited from weighing the evidence submitted before
the arbitrator, regardless of whether the court believes there to be sufficient
evidence, or even any evidence, to support the award. 9
83 Greene, 468 S.E.2d at 352 (emphasis added).
84 See id. The court will vacate an award only if the rights of the applying
party are prejudiced by:
(1) Corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; (2)
Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) An overstepping of
the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that
a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made; or (4) A failure to follow the procedure of the [Georgia
Arbitration Code], unless the party applying to vacate the award
continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without
objection.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b).
85 The court citedRaymerv. Foster & Cooper, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) and Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 335 S.E.2d
708 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
86 Greene, 468 S.E.2d at 352 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(d) (Supp.
1996)). KRS § 417.160 also contains this language. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
87 Greene, 468 S.E.2d at 353.
8 See id.
89 Id. at 354.
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Accordingly, the lower court's decision to vacate the arbitration award was
reversed.
In further explaining its decision to limit judicial vacation of arbitration
awards to the grounds set forth in the Georgia Arbitration Act, the Greene
court discussed the policy considerations for allowing only very limited
judicial review. The court stated that "allowing an appellate court to make a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence in arbitration cases would
only frustrate the purpose of arbitration."9° The court explained:
A primary advantage of arbitration is the expeditious and final resolution of
disputes by means that circumvent the time and expense associated with civil
litigation. The legislature recognized this advantage by enacting the
Arbitration Code, in which it made limited provisions [sic] for the judicial
review of arbitration awards, and set forth four grounds upon which a court
may vacate awards. However, that legislative action did not make arbitration
apart of the judicial process, nor did it make arbitration subject to traditional
rules of appellate review. To the contrary, arbitration is a unique procedure
that exists in Georgia due to legislative flat, and it is conducted in accor-
dance with the rules established by the legislature. Were we to allow an
appellate court to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support
an arbitration award, we would make such awards entirely subject to
independent determinations by courts of law, and thereby frustrate the
prompt resolution of arbitrated disputes and the finality of arbitration
awards.91
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Greene was praised by many
arbitration supporters, including the Atlanta Bar Association and eleven
construction trade organizations.92 These organizations had joined the case
as amicus curiae, claiming that the lower court's decision would have
crippled arbitration.93 A supporter of the holding in Greene stated that "[t]he
opinion is in accord with the general rule of courts across the country. It's
clearly in the spirit of the present judicial environment in this country which
is seeking to incur alternative means of dispute resolution." '94 It was pointed
out that the parties had agreed to arbitrate disputes and that the Greene
90 Id.
9' Id. (emphasis added).92 See Lolita Browning, That's Why It's Called Binding, FULTON COUNTY
DAiLY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Apr. 12, 1996, at 1.
9' See id.94 Id. (quoting Superior Court Judge Jack P. Etheridge, current head of the
Atlanta office of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services/Endispute).
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opinion merely honors that agreement and stresses that the purpose of
arbitration is to avoid litigation.9'
IV. VACATION OF ARBITRATION AWARDs:
THE FEDERAL STANDARDS
The Federal Arbitration Act also contains a provision that governs when
a court shall vacate an arbitration award.96 The grounds for vacating an
arbitration award under the Federal Act parallel those in the Kentucky
Uniform Arbitration Act.97 This Part provides an overview of judicial
95 See id.
96 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (West Supp. 1996).
9' Section 10 of the Federal.Arbitration Act governs when a court may
vacate an arbitration award. It mirrors the grounds set forth in both the Kentucky
Arbitration Act and the Georgia Arbitration Code. Section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
(b) The United States district court for the district wherein an award
was made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make
an order vacating the award upon the application of a person, other than
a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the
award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with
the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.
Id.; compare with KRS § 417.160 (see supra note 36 and accompanying text).
Both KRS § 417.160 and section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act are essentially
aimed at judicial enforcement of arbitration awards, unless the award was
procured through corruption or fraud. The Kentucky statute emphasizes that
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application of the Federal Arbitration Act and the standards courts have
applied in determining whether to vacate an arbitration award.
Many courts have had the occasion to apply the terms of section 10 of
the Federal Arbitration Act and have generally afforded great deference to
arbitration decisions.9" Although courts have not consistently held that the
statutory grounds for vacation of an arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act are exclusive," courts have seldom vacated arbitration
awards under the Federal Arbitration Act.'00
arbitral awards cannot be vacated simply because such an award would not have
been granted by a court.
98 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.5.2.1
(1994).
9 Many courts have expressly stated that the Federal Arbitration Act
provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award. See Barbier v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that judicial
review of an arbitration award is narrowly limited and may be vacated only if
at least one of the grounds specified in the Federal Arbitration Act is found to
exist); Saxis S. S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1967) (stating that where parties have agreedthat any dispute between them shall
be submitted to arbitration, the role of the court is limited to determining
whether there exists one of the specific grounds for vacation of an award
provided by the Federal Arbitration Act); Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So. 2d
1376 (Ala.) (stating that under federal law, it is not the function of the court to
agree or disagree with the reasoning of the arbitrator, but only to ascertain
whether there exists one of the specific grounds for vacation of the award),
overruled on other grounds by Temimix Intern. Co. v. Jackson, 628 So. 2d 1376
(Ala. 1992). However, some courts have stated or suggested that grounds to
vacate an arbitration award exist in addition to the statutory grounds. See Lee v.
Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.) (stating that judicial review of arbitration awards
is narrowly limited and an arbitration award will not be set aside unless it is
completely irrational or evidences manifest disregard for law), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 906 (1993); Trustees of Lawrence Academy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 59 (D.N.H. 1993) (stating that in addition
to statutory basis for review of arbitration awards, the court may properly vacate
an arbitration award that is contrary to the plain language of the collective
bargaining agreement or that is made in manifest disregard of the applicable
law); Transit Cas. Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp. 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the standard of review for arbitration awards is
extremely narrow and that courts may vacate the award only upon a showing of
one of the statutory grounds enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, or if the
arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law, or if the award is incomplete,
ambiguous, or contradictory), aJfd, 841 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1988). See infra
notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
1()0 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.6.2.
1996-97]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Even before the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, courts
applied a consistent approach to arbitration awards: awards should be
confirmed and enforced unless there is clear evidence of a gross
impropriety.' A leading case before the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act is Burchell v. Marsh,0 2 where the United States Su-
preme Court stated that the general principles upon which a court will
vacate an arbitration award are "too well settled by numerous decisions
to admit of doubt."'0 3 The Burchell court explained:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters
submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling
disputes it should receive every encouragement from courts of equity.
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision
of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact.'°
The Federal Arbitration Act reflects this "pro-award stance" and has been
consistently sustained by the courts.'0 5
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that judicial review of arbitration awards is "severely limited, being
confined to determining whether or not one ofthe grounds specified by
[the Federal Arbitration Act] for vacation of an award exists."'0 6 The
Second Circuit explained that this restriction is "to further the objective
of arbitration, which is to enable parties to resolve disputes promptly and
inexpensively, without resort to litigation and often without any require-
ment that the arbitrators state the rationale behind their decision."'0 7
Courts have articulated "that the 'strong policy' favoring 'voluntary
commercial arbitration' requires the judicial review of an arbitration
award be 'narrowly limited.""0 8 Thus, in Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy'0 9
10 See id. § 40.1.4 (citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344
(1854)).
102 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854).
103 Id. at 349.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
105 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.1.4.
106 Office of Supply, Gov't of the Republic of Korea v. New York Nay. Co.,
469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).
107 id.
10' See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.1.4.
'09 Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
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the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated "[t]he statute does not allow
courts to roam unbridled in their oversight of arbitral awards, but
carefully limits judicial intervention to instances where the arbitration has
been tainted in certain specific ways."'" 0
Many courts state that the grounds for vacating an arbitration award
enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive. This principle
has been expressed by the Fifth,'" Sixth, 1 2 Seventh," 3  and
Ninth" 4 Circuits. The United States Supreme Court stated in Wilko v.
Swan"5 that judicial power to vacate an arbitration award is limited and
that a court may vacate an award only when one of the statutory grounds
is met." 6
Other courts, however, have developed what appear to be
independent, non-statutory grounds for setting aside arbitration
awards." 7  The courts include the First,"' Third," 9  Fifth,'20
"10 Id. at8.
"' See Mellroy v. Paine Webber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting argument to vacate arbitration award that was allegedly a result of
"gross mistake").
112 See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1212 (6th Cir.
1982) ("The federal Arbitration Act provides the exclusive remedy for chal-
lenging an award. ... ").
",3 See ChameleonDental Prod., Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir.
1991) (rejecting a "manifest disregard of the law" exception to review under the
Federal Arbitration Act).
".. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, sets out the grounds
upon which a federal court may vacate the decision of an arbitration panel.").
15 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
116 See id. at 436 & n.22 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (West Supp. 1996)).
"' See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.5.1.2.
",8 See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding two
categories of cases subject to review: 1) labor law cases where an award is
contrary to plain meaning of agreement, and 2) cases where it is clear from the
record that the arbitrator recognized applicable law and ignored it).
9 See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868
F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We must determine if the form of the arbitrators'
award can be rationally derived either from the agreement between the parties
or the parties' submissions .... ."); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466
F.2d 1125, 1131-34 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that under the agreement the
arbitrator did not have the authority to award a $6 million cash bond).
120 See Anderman/Smith Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215,
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Eighth,121 Tenth, 122 and Eleventh 123  Circuits. These courts have
articulated many different labels for these allegedly non-statutory
grounds, including "arbitrary or capricious,,121 "completely
irrational," '125 "manifest disregard of law and fact,"126 "contrary to the
plain language of the collective bargaining agreement,"'2 7 failure "to
draw its essence" from the contract,'28 "a sort of 'abuse of discretion'
standard,"' 29 "unfounded in reason and fact,"'30 and that the award is
against public policy. 3'
Regardless of what many courts say, it is unclear whether the
allegedly non-statutory doctrines are independent of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act's ground for vacation,' or whether they simply define the
statutory ground.'33 "Not only can these grounds be viewed as putting
flesh on the bare bones of [the Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(4)], but
1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that an arbitrator's award must be rationally in-
ferable from the agreement).
121 See Osceola County Rural Water Sys. v. Subsurfco, 914 F.2d 1072, 1075
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that, in addition to the grounds specified in the Federal
Arbitration Act, an award may be vacated if it fails to draw its essence from the
contract).
122 See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir.
1988) ("[F]ederal courts have never limited their scope of review to a strict
reading of [9 U.S.C. § 10].").
123 See Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (1 lth Cir.
1993) (citing two non-statutory bases for vacating an award: 1) if award is
arbitrary and capricious; and 2) if award is contrary to public policy).
124 Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1412 (11 th Cir. 1990).
125 French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906
(9th Cir. 1991).
126 Pacific Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d
1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1991).
127 Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990).
128 Anderman/Smith Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215,
1218 (5th Cir. 1990).
129 Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir.
1988).
130 Local 1445, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO
v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1985).
131 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.5.1.2.
132 Section 10(a)(4) provides for vacation if "the arbitrators exceeded their
powers." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
133 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.5.1.3.
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they should be so recognized .... ""' Reasons the purportedly non-
statutory grounds should be so viewed include the argument that "when
these grounds are treated as independent, [the Federal Arbitration Act §
10(a)(4)] itself means very little, and its judicial recognition is
slighted.'
'1 35
In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd.,36 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the principle that the "so-called non-statutory
grounds" are methods of defining section 10(a)(4) of the Federal
Arbitration Act. 137 The court stated:
[Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(4)] sets out the grounds upon which a
federal court may vacate the decision of an arbitration panel. The statute
addresses decisions influenced by corruption or undue influence, and
cases in which arbitrators exceed their power under the terms of the
agreement to arbitrate. Courts have interpreted this section narrowly, in
light of Supreme Court authority strictly limiting federal review of
arbitration decisions. It is generally held that an arbitration award will
not be set aside unless it evidences a "manifest disregard for law."' 38
As explained in Todd Shipyards, the Ninth Circuit believes that "manifest
disregard for law," a non-statutory ground for vacating an arbitration
award, is subsumed within the "exceeded their powers" ground enumerat-
ed in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 39 The treatment of non-
statutory doctrines in Todd Shipyards represents a sound approach that
conforms to the spirit of the Federal Arbitration Act and furthers the
policies of arbitration.14 °
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Greene v. Hundley4'
and the application of the Federal Arbitration Act by the Fifth, Sixth,
134 id.
' Id. (providing a detailed analysis of why the non-statutory grounds for
vacating an arbitration award should be viewed as a substantiation of the statute).
136 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1991).
137 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.5.1.3.
131 Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1059-60 (citations omitted).
,31 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 98, § 40.5.1.3.
140 See id.
14' Greene v. Hundley, 468 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1996).
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Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as well as the United States Supreme
Court"' demonstrate that the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co.'43 is unwise. Consequently,
intervention by Kentucky courts in the name of equity to vacate
arbitration awards should not survive the enactment of the Kentucky
Uniform Arbitration Act."'
Parties choose to arbitrate their disputes for several reasons.
Arbitration affords privacy, flexibility, and an opportunity to avoid the
court system.'45 Avoiding the court system allows parties to resolve
disputes in a more efficient, inexpensive, and prompt manner, and better
preserves business relationships.' 46 Arbitration also benefits the judicial
system because it eases congested court calendars.1 47 Because of these
policy considerations favoring arbitration, judicial review of arbitration
awards should be extremely limited. The statutory grounds for vacating
an award should be exclusive, thereby preventing a court from vacating
an award based on a mistake of law.
When parties incorporate arbitration clauses into a contract, they have
essentially agreed that if a dispute arises, the determination of the
designated neutral shall be substituted for that of a court. The parties
expect that the decision of the arbitrator will be final, absent extreme
circumstances, including corruption, fraud, partiality, and other circum-
stances codified by the statutes. 4 By vacating awards on grounds other
than those enumerated in the statutes, courts not only defeat the intent of
the contracting parties, they also undermine many of the policies
supporting arbitration.
142 See supra notes 69-95, 111-16 and accompanying text.
141 Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1991).
'44 KRS §§ 417.045-.240. This is further supported by the fact that the
Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act provides that "[t]he fact that the relief was
such that it could not or would not be granted by a court is not ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award." Id. § 417.160(1)(e). This language
mirrors that found in Section 9-9-13(d) of the Georgia Arbitration Code. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
145 See Local No. 153, Office of Prof 1 Employees Int'l Union v. Trust Co.,
522 A.2d 992, 994-95 (N.J. 1987) (discussing the purpose of arbitration with
respect to labor disputes).
146 See Aptowitzer, supra note 3, at 999 (listing reasons why arbitration has
become a favored alternative to litigation).
147 See Cargill v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 833, 834 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983) (discussing the benefits of arbitration).
'48 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Allowing the grounds for vacating an award enumerated in the
Kentucky Arbitration Act to be exclusive would best further the purposes
of arbitration - the prompt resolution of arbitrated disputes and the
finality of arbitration awards. Consequently, the approach of the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Carrs Fork v. Kodak Mining should be abandoned.

